The military provides a myriad of extensive capabilities until civilian agencies are able to perform these functions adequately. The implication for planners is that all of the units previously mentioned can be deployed outside their normal military roles, beyond their ability to maintain sustained operations, or be unavailable for re-deployment. During initial preparation, planners must consider that “…overextending such forces may jeopardize their ability to support combat operations.” (JP 3-07, 1995, p. IV-9).

Termination of Operations

There are no handbooks to guide the leadership or lists of situations that identify when to terminate operations. It’s important that military leaders plan for transitions and termination. “As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete… Planners should schedule redeployment of specific units as soon as possible after their part in the operation has been completed.” (JP 3-07, 1995, IV – 12). Termination may include transition to civil authorities, marking and clearing minefields, closing financial obligations, pre-redeployment activities, or redeploying forces.

In MOOTW there are no easily identifiable enemy military formations to attack and destroy, no single credible government or political actor with which to deal, no formal declaration or termination of conflict, no specific territory to take and hold. Also, there is no guarantee that any agreement between contending authorities will be honored, and thus, how you end and operation is just as important as when you end it. “The manner in which U.S. forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation…” (JP 3-07, 1995, IV – 12).

The New Logic of MOOTW

The increasing trend toward military engagement in small operations has raised concerns which revolve around reduced capabilities and sufficient units of the appropriate types. Military leaders must understand the challenges of MOOTW and develop a broader strategy for shared engagement with the civil-political dimension. Military leaders must be sensitive to the level of future operations, which is highly uncertain. Current forces can meet peak demands but they may encounter serious difficulties such as forces committed to these operations not being immediately available for theater warfare and high demands might fall very unevenly on the armed services or upon certain types of units within the services.